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CONSISTENCY, PROPORTIONALITY, AND SUBSTANTIVE JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN CAPITAL SENTENCING

H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr.
I need to start off with two disclaimers. First, it may be unnecessary to say, but the
views I express here are my own and not necessarily those of the Department of
Justice. The second disclaimer is that my professional experience with the death
penalty is really quite limited. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where I work,
we have had two capital cases since Furman [v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972)], both
in the last three years. The first case was tried a couple of times and resulted in a
temporary holding that fingerprint evidence is not admissible in federal court, and then
resulted in a life sentence. So we obviously have no postconviction review issues in
that case. The second case was indicted about a year ago and has yet to go to trial. It's
scheduled for the spring.
Despite that limited practical experience and the fact, I think, that the Council's
proposals are much more likely to have an impact in other states than they are on the
federal system, I'm enormously interested in the project and I thank Professor
Hoffmann and the Law School for inviting me to participate. I also want to thank
Governor Romney and the Governor's Council for doing a great service, I think, for
everyone who is interested in the death penalty. Whether you are a strong supporter of
the death penalty, an abolitionist, or a respectful agnostic, you have reason to hope that
the Council's work is going to have an impact and will certainly enhance both the
nature and quality of the debate on the subject.
Before I turn to the proposals for postconviction review, I would like to begin with a
related general observation. I think that the Governor's Council has done a superb job
of identifying and then addressing most of the most significant non-abolitionist
objections to the death penalty, although we've heard in the last two days that
addressing the problem doesn't necessarily mean you've solved it. But, I think you've
addressed them quite well.
The Council has worked very hard, and I think successfully, to blunt the set of very
legitimate practical objections to the death penalty that center on the risk that
undeserving people, either people who aren't guilty or people who don't deserve the
death penalty, might be executed. And we've learned in the last couple ofdays that the
proposed scheme effectively and sharply limits the crimes eligible for death. It also
notes the problem of aggravator creep, although I don't think it solved that problem. It
addresses the tragically pervasive problem of underqualified or unqualified defense
counsel; although it doesn't describe the funding mechanism it's going to create to
handle that problem. And it includes several factors, including ones that we're talking
about today, that-are designed to make sure that we are really sure that the defendant
both committed the crime in question and that the defendant in some sense, a moral
sense, deserves the death penalty.
In short, the Council has gone very far down the road of reducing the risk of what
Professor Lillquist described yesterday as false positives. One of those proposals that I
think is quite problematic is the requirement of strongly corroborative scientific
evidence. I guess I should give another disclaimer and that is the case of a death
penalty prosecution pending in our district. We don't have any strongly corroborative
scientific evidence. It's a witness retaliation murder and we've got great evidence. But,

2005]

PANEL FOUR-POST-TRIAL REVIEW

we don't have any scientific evidence. So perhaps that colors my criticism of that
provision.
There are other false-positive reducing proposals that I think are good ideas and I
think that probably ought to be implemented both inside and outside the death penalty.
One of those is the development and use of appropriate instructions on how to evaluate
eyewitness testimony and how to evaluate accomplice testimony. If they're properly
crafted, and again, the devil is in the details, as someone said yesterday, I think those
are instructions that ought to be used in ordinary criminal cases as well as in capital
cases.
My central question about the entire project is whether the Council has tried so hard
to appease critics of the death penalty that it has created a system in which it will be
almost impossible to obtain a death sentence. To put it differently, has the
understandable and legitimate fear of overinclusive application of the death penalty led
to the creation of a system that is dramatically underinclusive to the point of rendering
the prospect of the death penalty largely illusory. That's not an entirely rhetorical
question, although my answer would be yes, or at least probably, or maybe more
hopefully, I hope we'll have the chance to see.
That doesn't mean I'm a supporter of wide application of the death penalty or even
a supporter of the death penalty. I'm going to take the Council's prerogative and keep
that a secret. But what's not a secret is my view that even if it turns out that there is the
political will in Massachusetts to pass this set of proposals, I think the death penalty
there will turn out to be very much more symbolic than real. There are lots of reasons
why I hope that does happen. One of which is, I think some of us would like to get
back together here at Indiana to watch Professor Zimring move the nickel across the
campus with his nose.
But in any event, turning to the postconviction proposals, I certainly believe that
there is a place for substantive appellate review in criminal sentencing including in
capital cases. I work in the federal system where substantive appellate review of
sentences is a daily fact of life. It is the principal grist of our appellate practice. Or at
least it will be until the Supreme Court rules on Blakely [v. Washington, 124 S. Ct.
2531 (2004)] and Booker and Fanfan [UnitedStates v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005)].
Substantive appellate review of sentencing can be and is quite useful. Over time a body
of law develops around each of the guideline provisions, or has developed around each
of the guideline provisions, and that body of law helpfully guides sentencing judges
and other system participants, and promotes the goals of consistency and rationality in
sentencing.
I understand from Professor Hoffmann's comments yesterday and today that the
Governor's Council considered and rejected, or at least in appearance rejected, one
form of substantive appellate review and that's comparative proportionality review.
The Council accepted Professor Hoffmann's argument, I gather, that that sort of review
is hopelessly flawed. I don't pretend to know enough to know whether that was a good
call or a bad call. But at least comparative proportionality review would have or could
have given judges some guidance on how they are supposed to review death sentences.
It will be interesting to see, particularly in light of Mr. Meade's comments, in Illinois
and Massachusetts, whether comparative proportionality review actually becomes the
mechanism by which judges choose to review capital sentencing, because it doesn't
appear that they're given much else in the proposal in Massachusetts.
And what the Council proposes instead of comparative proportionality review is to
allow the trial judge-Professor Hoffmann focused on appellate review; my concerns
are mostly focused on the trial judge-in the first instance, and then the Supreme
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Judicial Court later, to decide whether or not they agree with the jury's decision to
impose death. I learned last night that the trial judge's decision to reject death may be
reviewable by the Supreme Judicial Court. It still appears to me that there are no real
meaningful standards offered to govern the question of whether judges should uphold
the death sentence or not.
Again, I'm talking about cases that qualify for death both in terms of culpability
standards and in terms of evidentiary standards. I assume that there will be no problem
when appellate review endeavors to correct an erroneous determination that the murder
in question qualifies for death or that there was adequate corroborating scientific
evidence. I think that would work just fine. But that's not what we're talking about.
We're talking about the gut check review by the trial judge first and the Supreme
Judicial Court later of the decision to impose death by the jury.
I think it's worth quoting the relevant language of the proposal, which I recognize
the Council largely inherited from existing Massachusetts law. Trial judges are directed
to set aside the death sentence, "Whenever the trial judge finds the death sentence to be
inappropriate on any basis in fact or law, including the trial judge's own disagreement
with the exercise of capital sentencing discretion by the jury." In case anyone didn't get
the point, the Council notes this language should be broadly construed. I'm not quite
sure how else you can construe that language. Assuming ajury-imposed death sentence
survives the trial judge, then the Supreme Judicial Court is instructed to set aside the
sentence whenever that Court finds, and again I'm quoting, "The verdict was against
the law or the weight of the evidence," and we're okay so far, "or for any other reason
that justice may require." Again, the Council says that phrase includes situations where
the only reason to set aside the death sentence is that the Court simply disagrees with
the exercise of capital sentencing discretion by a jury.
To my mind, a likely consequence of such a system, particularly in the trial court, is
to undermine both consistency and rationality in capital sentencing with the only
possible benefit being the reduction of false positives through the raw reduction of
capital sentences overall. We will reduce false positives because judges will throw out
death sentences, and as a result, we may feel better when we go to bed that night. But
the question is whether that benefit, the raw reduction of capital sentences overall,
thereby reducing some measure of false positives, is then worth the cost?
To answer that question we have to remember what sort of false positives we're
protecting against here in the Massachusetts system. I'm not talking about Indiana or
anywhere else. We have a defendant who has been found guilty of murder; the murder
in question was found to fit within the narrow band of capital murders defined by the
statute, assuming we don't have aggravator creep; the conviction was based in part on
strongly corroborative scientific evidence; and the jury had no lingering or residual
doubt. So the only real question is whether the jury got it right in terms of weighing the
defendant's specific mitigators. How do we know whether the jury got it right? Well, I
guess Professor Hoffmann and Justice Harlan said we don't and we can't know
whether the jury got it right. We're just giving a couple of other bodies the opportunity
to make their own call.
I think it's a system that, as constructed, does not allow juries and judges in
subsequent cases-I guess just judges; juries we're going to try to keep this a secret
from--but juries and judges in subsequent cases aren't going to get much meaningful
guidance from this substantive review about how to exercise capital sentencing
discretion. To me the benefit of substantive appellate review is not to just to get it right
in the particular case, but to give guidance in the future so we get it right in future
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cases. This proposal only has half of that. And at the trial level I don't think it even
offers that help.
Now, maybe Massachusetts could or will or maybe even already does require a
statement of reasons anytime a judge or a court sets aside a capital sentence based on
disagreement with the jury's choice. If that were not the case, then I would certainly
recommend that there be a required statement of reasons. Then perhaps there might
develop a sort of common law governing the exercise of capital sentencing discretion
that would guide judges in the future given the nature of the standard as articulated,
though I'm not optimistic that even if we required a statement ofreasons that we would
develop helpful guidelines. Unless perhaps it just evolved into comparative
proportionality review.
A careful and narrowly defined set of capital-eligible murders, which I think we
have here in this Massachusetts proposal, has a number of purposes. One is to ensure
that only those deserving death get death. Another purpose is, or ought to be, to reduce
the chance that those deserving death manage to escape it. In other words, a narrow set
of aggravators addresses the related problems of overinclusiveness and
underinclusiveness. By allowing judges, in particular trial judges, to set aside capital
sentences without meaningful standards to guide them, I think we are promoting
arbitrary underinclusiveness. And that's bad for the legitimacy of the death penalty. It's
probably bad for the criminal justice system as a whole.
I don't pretend to know much about the trial bench in Massachusetts, but if it's
much like that in Pennsylvania or even the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in federal
court, the prospect of getting a jury sentence of death set aside will vary wildly
depending on who the judge is. And I know Professor Schornhorst, if he were in
Massachusetts, the first thing he's going to do is find out who the judge is. And it's
going to make a big difference to him as to whether the death sentence is going to stand
or not stand.
It may be that the Supreme Judicial Court can afford a greater measure of
consistency and maybe impose some discipline on trial judges. If they're going to
review trial judges' disagreements with jury imposition of the death penalty, I'm not
sure how they're going to do it. But as far as I can tell, the review mechanism is not set
up now to create a coherent set of guidelines that will steer future exercises of
discretion. Instead, it looks to me like a mechanism designed to reduce false positives
using the blunt instrument of arbitrary reduction of death sentences.
Ijust have two other comments. My other comment about recommendation number
nine is a positive one. And that goes back to the role of the trial judge in advance of
trial. Giving trial judges the ability to weed out cases that are not legitimate capital
cases as early as possible in the process makes good sense, but Professor Schornhorst
and I might disagree about what that proceeding ought to look like. There is no reason
to continue an extraordinarily costly process down the road when you can make
judgments early in the process and take it out of the capital stream. Although, again, if
the Attorney General in his or her oversight role does a goodjob, there probably won't
be that many cases in this sort of system where it's necessary to dismiss a case that is
charged capitally inappropriately.
As for recommendation number ten, which calls for creation of a Death Penalty
Review Commission, I think that's a great idea. Although, again, under the totality of
the Commission's proposals, I don't think that Commission is going to have very much
work to do. Thank you.

